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Presentation Objectives
♦Provide an overview of the Ares I-X Range Safety flight analysis 
data products
♦Discuss the approach used to develop Ares I-X Range Safety flight 
analysis data products
♦Present validation and verification methods and results for Ares I-X 
range safety final flight data package products
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Ares I-X Test Flight Overview
♦ Ares I-X was the first test flight of the Ares I crew 
launch vehicle (CLV) developed by NASA’s 
Constellation Program (CxP)
♦ Launch: 
• October 28, 2009
• Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39 Pad B, U.S. Air 
Force (USAF) Eastern Range
♦ Primary Objective:
• Demonstrate controllability of the Ares I design
♦ Vehicle Description:
• Full scale Ares I representation with similar outer mold line 
(OML)
• Heritage Space Shuttle Program (SSP) 4 segment Reusable 
Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) First Stage (FS)
• Inert US and CEV simulators (USS and CEVS)
♦ Trajectory Description
• Due east, suborbital flight
• Designed to match Ares I dynamic pressure vs. Mach 
number relationship
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Range Safety Final Flight Data Package 
Requirements Overview
♦The USAF required the Ares Flight Test Program to meet Air Force 
Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710 requirements to obtain 
flight plan approval to launch from the Eastern Range
♦Volume 2 Flight Safety Requirements includes the Final Flight Data 
Package (FFDP) space vehicle flight analysis requirements:
• Nominal trajectory
• Flight envelopes
• Impact footprints of all jettisoned bodies and debris
• Malfunction Turn Analysis
• Debris Analysis
• Buoyancy Analysis
• Acoustic Analysis
• Sonic Boom Analysis
♦The FFDP is used by USAF 45th Space Wing (45SW) to calculate 
public safety risk, generate flight rules, launch commit criteria, and 
range safety displays
♦AFSPCMAN 91-710 requires a post flight performance analysis
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Range Safety  Flight Analysis Approach
♦ All Range Safety flight analyses were approved by the Constellation 
Program’s “Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel” (LCRSP) and Ares I-X 
SE&I
♦ The LCRSP Range Safety Trajectory Working Group (RSTWG) provided a 
forum for the cross-organizational development and review of flight analysis 
data products
• Validation that the analysis methodologies and data products met the intent of the 
requirements was achieved through 45SW participation in the RSTWG
• Verification of the FFDP data product’s accuracy was achieved through agreement with a 
second set of FFDP data products generated by analysis teams using independent 
simulation software
− Non flight simulation data products were verified through organizational reviews
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Product Primary Source Verification Source
Nominal Ascent Trajectories LaRC JSC and MSFC
Nominal Impact Points LaRC Aerospace Corp.
Flight Envelopes LaRC MSFC
Stage Disposal Footprints LaRC Aerospace Corp.
Malfunction Turn Analysis LaRC JSC
Debris Analysis LaRC NESC review
Acoustic Analysis LaRC LaRC review
Sonic Boom Analysis LaRC LaRC review
Buoyancy Analysis JPL LaRC review
Range Safety FFDP Analyses Overview:
Nominal Trajectory
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♦ The most representative reference, or nominal trajectory defines the flight 
parameter time history and timeline for key events
♦ Trajectory analyses were performed for a launch season from July 1 through 
November 30
♦ Monthly nominal trajectories were developed for mean monthly atmospheric 
conditions, wind, and propellant mean bulk temperature
♦ The September nominal trajectory was determined to be representative of 
the entire launch season
♦ Nominal product: nominal trajectory time history data
Range Safety FFDP Analyses Overview: 
Flight Envelopes
♦ Flight envelopes defined the limits of flight of the normally operating FTV in the 
Range Safety horizontal and vertical planes
♦ The vacuum instantaneous impact point (IIP) is tracked in the horizontal plane 
and provides a measure of the downrange and crossrange travel
♦ The FTV present position is tracked in the vertical planes and provides a 
measure of the steepness of flight
♦ Envelope product:
• 4 horizontal plan envelopes: Maximum IIP, Minimum IIP, Left IIP, Right IIP
• 2 vertical plane envelopes: Launch Area Lateral (LAL) and Launch Area Steep (LAS)
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Horizontal Plane (Top View) Vertical Plane (Side Views)
Range Safety FFDP Analyses Overview: 
Disposal
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♦Disposal, or impact, footprints 
defined the area over which all 
jettisoned bodies impacted the 
ocean
♦Ares I-X jettisoned bodies:
• USS
• FS
• FS nose cap
• FS forward skirt extension
♦Monthly and seasonal footprints encompassed the 99.73 
percentile of FS and USS reentry Monte Carlo analyses impact 
points.
♦Disposal product:
• Jettisoned bodies reentry data
• Disposal footprints
Range Safety FFDP Analyses Overview: 
Malfunction Turn Analysis
♦The malfunction turn analysis defined 
the extent to which the FTV could turn 
from its nominal trajectory due to a 
failure
♦Failure modes were defined by a 
probabilistic risk assessment and 
failure analysis performed by the 
RSTWG. Identified failure modes:
• Loss of thrust vector control
• RSRM nozzle burn through
• RSRM case breach
• Software failures
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♦Malfunction turn product:
• 8000+ malfunction turn trajectories
• Composite table describing the maximum turn angle of the velocity vectors 
produced from the set of malfunction turn trajectories at time intervals following 
the malfunction 
• List of all trajectories with the corresponding time of vehicle breakup and the 
probability of occurrence
Range Safety FFDP Analyses Overview: 
Debris Analysis
♦ The debris analysis determined the debris configurations that 
arose from vehicle breakup due to:
• Malfunction turn
• Uncontrolled tumble (USS reentry)
• Activation of the Flight Termination System
♦ The debris analysis characterized each debris configuration’s:
• Geometry
• Weight
• Aerodynamics
− Stability (trim or tumble)
− Trim angle
− Average lift and drag coefficient for aerodynamically unstable configurations.
− Trim lift and drag coefficient for configurations that trim
• Ballistic coefficient
♦ Breakup was assumed to occur at bolted joints
♦ FS motor segment debris was based on Shuttle data
♦ Debris product:
• Catalog of debris configurations and corresponding characteristics
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Range Safety FFDP Analyses Overview: 
Buoyancy Analysis
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♦The buoyancy analysis determined the 
potential for any jettisoned body or debris 
configuration to float after water impact
♦Any jettisoned body or piece of debris that 
has the potential to float must be recovered or 
sunk
♦Analysis determined 14 debris configurations 
could potentially float
• Debris configurations with one end closed by the
CEV simulator could trap air and float
♦The U.S. Coast Guard was contracted to 
locate and sink any floating debris
♦The USS broke up at water impact
♦No debris floated after water impact
Range Safety FFDP Analyses Overview: 
Acoustic Analysis and Sonic Boom Analysis
♦ The acoustic analysis defined the far field 
pressure level and acoustic spectra 
around the launch site
♦ The FTV RSRM generated an acoustic 
energy of 203 db
♦ Low frequency sound pressure levels 
above 85 db extended to Orlando due to 
lack of atmospheric attenuation
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♦ The sonic boom analysis determined the 
location and intensity of the sonic boom 
ground signature
♦ The sonic boom ground signature was 
determined from the FTV’s near field pressure 
signature and its pitch attitude along its 
trajectory
♦ The ground signature’s closest point to the 
shore was 26.8 nmi
Range Safety FFDP Analyses Overview: 
Post Flight Analysis
♦The Post Flight Analysis requirements were to document:
• FS performance
• On-board safety instrumentation (FTS) performance
• Failures that occurred and their affect on the FTV flight
• Probable cause of failure
• Comparison of planned and achieved FS cutoff state
• Estimated impact points of FS and USS
• Comparison of the best estimated flight trajectory to the FFDP flight envelopes
♦ Comparisons between the actual flight, post-flight simulation, and 
preflight simulation were also included
♦ The preflight simulation was updated with day of launch winds, RSRM 
PMBT, RSRM measured thrust 
to create the post-flight simulation
♦ The comparisons verified:
1. The flight occurred
within the predicted bounds
2. The simulation accurately 
predicted the FTV trajectory
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Range Safety Trajectory Analyses IV&V:
Simulation Verification
♦ Each team worked with an Ares I-X version of a 6DOF simulation
♦ Simulation verification was performed prior to product generation to ensure:
• Each vehicle and environmental model was implemented properly
• Methodology and implementation of the system dispersions, environmental dispersions, 
and failure modes were consistent
♦ Verification process:
1. Verify simulation models
− Simulation configuration management spreadsheet documenting model versions and overall 
simulation configuration
2. Execute run matrix
− Run matrix approved through Ares I-X range safety community, and included:
• Nominal trajectory
• Trajectories experiencing Range-defined worst case winds
• Representative malfunction trajectories
• Entry cases that stress the models added to the sim for Ares I-X
3. Establish agreement between simulation results to within tolerances
− Data comparisons were required to meet quantitative (required) and qualitative (desired) tolerances, 
including:
• G&C specific parameters
• Range-specific parameters were
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Center / Team 6DOF Simulation Product
LaRC POST2 Nominal, Envelopes, MT, Disposal
MSFC MAVERIC Nominal, Envelopes
JSC ANTARES Nominal, MT
The Aerospace Corp. PROCONSUL Disposal
Range Safety Trajectory Analyses IV&V:
Simulation Verification Tolerance Development
♦Tolerances were defined as quantitative or qualitative
• Quantitative (required) metric violations were investigated to identify 
and correct the root cause
• Qualitative (desired) metric violations were evaluated within the 
allowable timeframe in an effort to resolve the differences
♦Tolerances were derived from the following Shuttle 
process and range products:
• Evolved Shuttle Day-of-Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU) process 
tolerances
• Sensitivity tolerances or the effects of differences in certain state 
parameters on the corresponding differences in downrange and cross 
range impact positions
• Range radar tracking accuracy requirement
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Range Safety Trajectory Analyses IV&V:
Nominal Trajectory and Envelope V&V
♦ Product validation achieved through Ares I-X Range Safety community
♦ Product verification accomplished through qualitative and quantitative assessments of 
the results, reviewed and approved by the RSTWG
• Each team’s trajectories were plotted in respective envelope planes and compared qualitatively to 
ensure that the distribution of trajectories about the nominal were similar
− Qualitative comparison of envelope trajectories was performed first through visual comparison of Monte Carlo trends
− Significant errors in the simulations or method of post-processing manifested themselves as diverging dispersed 
trajectories
− Qualitative comparisons were adequate to continue on to the quantitative comparisons
• Differences between the two simulations were quantitatively compared using the simulation match criteria 
previously established for the simulation verification
♦ Quantitative comparison was performed by extracting the calculated boundary from 
each of the Monte Carlo sets and differencing the plots
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Range Safety Trajectory Analyses IV&V:
Disposal V&V
♦ Product validation achieved through Ares I-X Range Safety community
♦ Product verification achieved through:
• Comparison of disposal footprints of 2000-case Monte Carlo analysis run in both simulations using 
different random dispersion sets
• Demonstration that verification cases met required metrics
♦ Overall level of agreement in the statistical results for the 2000-case Monte Carlo 
runs was excellent
♦ Debris ellipses for both simulations were very similar and the coordinates differed 
by less that 0.005 [deg]
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POST2 PROCONSUL
Range Safety Trajectory Analyses IV&V:
Malfunction Turn V&V
♦Product validation achieved through Ares I-X Range Safety 
community
♦Product verification:
• Time histories for randomly 
selected were trajectories 
compared directly to within
verification tolerances
• Composite turn tables 
compared directly
• Vehicle breakup times 
compared directly 
♦Product QA:
• Confirmation of data frequency and delivery formatting
• MT trajectories compared to nominal up to malfunction time
• Numerical comparison of trajectory probability table to PRA documentation
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POST2 / ANTARES turn angle comparisons
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Summary
♦ All Flight Analysis data products were successfully generated and 
delivered to the 45SW in time to support the launch
♦ The IV&V effort allowed data generators to work through issues early
♦ Data consistency proved through 
the IV&V process provided 
confidence that the delivered 
data was of high quality
♦ Flight plan approval was 
granted for the launch
♦ The test flight was successful
and had no safety related issues
♦ The flight occurred within the
predicted flight envelopes
♦ Post flight reconstruction results 
verified the simulations accurately
predicted the FTV trajectory
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